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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This action was commenced and prosecuted in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Utah, in and for Salt Lake County, by owners 
of second preferred shares of the defendant corpora-
tion to secure an adjudication by the courts of the right 
of the defendant to call for redemption and to redeem 
said shares of stock. The complaint states three causes 
of action. By the first and third causes, plaintiffs seek 
to have declared null and void and without legal effect 
a purported amendment to the articles of incorporation 
of defendant, whereby it is sought to make said 
preferred shares redeemable at the pleasure of the 
Board of Directors of defendant, and to restrain and 
enjoin the defendant company, its officers, and directors 
from redeeming or retiring, or attempting to redeem 
and retire, said shares of second preferred stock owned 
by the plaintiffs and one other owner who is not a party 
to this action. By the second cause of action, plaintiffs 
seek a judgment declaring the rights of the plaintiffs 
and owners of said preferred shares and the rights and 
duties of the defendant in respect thereto and, in par-
ticular, the plaintiffs ask that the judgment declare the 
said purported amendment to the articles of incorpora-
tion of the defendant null and void insofar as it affects 
the shares of preferred stock now issued and outstand-
ing. The three causes of action allege in general the 
identical facts, and they differ only with respect to the 
legal theory and conclusions the pleader deduced from 
them. 
2 
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At the trial each of the parties moved for judgment 
on the pleadings. (R. 51, 52.) The fundamental facts 
were not in dispute. The denials and traverses found in 
the pleadings are denials of legal conclusions of the 
opposing pleader, and are not denials of material facts, 
concerning which there was and is no controversy. 
The trial court granted the motion of defendant and 
denied plaintiffs' motion (R. 63), and thereafter, formal 
judgment, bearing date of January 6, 1950, denying 
plaintiffs' motion and granting defendant's motion and 
adjudicating the controversy in defendant's favor, was 
signed, entered and filed. (R. 53, 54.) The plaintiffs 
appealed to the Supreme Court from this judgment. (R. 
64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. For a considerable period of time prior to 
November 10, 1947, there were twelve persons and cor-
porations the owners and holders of 1826 shares of 
class 2 preferred stock of the defendant corporation. At 
the time of the commencement of this action a total of 
1501 shares were owned and held by the plaintiffs in 
this action, in the several separate ownerships alleged 
in Paragraph IV of the complaint. (R. 02.) One A. F. 
Tilton owned 325 shares, but she did not join in this 
action. While this action was pending, one of the plain-
tiffs, Ethelbell M. Harmon, sold and transferred on the 
books of the company 50 shares of her stock to Edna 
Dayton, one of the original plaintiffs, 25 shares to R. C. 
Granville, and 25 shares to J. E. Benedict. (R. 44, 45.) 
3 
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By order of Court made, entered and filed on December 
28, 1948, the said Granville and Benedict were made 
parties plaintiff in this action. (R. 42, 43.) The conse-
quence of the transactions above related was to reduce 
the ownership of Harmon's shares to 800; increase 
Dayton's shares to 58; and add Granville and Benedict 
as owners of class 2 preferred stock, each with owner-
ship of 25 shares. The total number of shares, viz. 1501, 
involved in this action, therefore remains the same. (R. 
44,45.) 
During the pendency of this action, to-wit on the 
24th day of March, 1949, the plaintiff Ethelbell M. Har-
mon died in Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, State of 
California. Upon application of Edwin A. Meserve, the 
regularly appointed, qualified and acting Executor of 
the Estate and under the Last Will and Testament and 
codicils thereto of said Ethelbell M. Harmon, deceased 
(said appointment having been made in the Superior 
Court of the State of California in and for Los Angeles 
County), made and filed in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Probate Division, and after due 
notice thereon, the said Last Will and Testament and 
codicils thereto of said deceased were admitted to pro-
bate in the last mentioned Court, and WILLIAM J. 
COWAN, of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
was appointed Administrator with the Will annexed of 
the estate of said deceased. Said Cowan qualified as 
such administrator with the will annexed. Based upon 
stipulation of the parties hereto, the above entitled 
4 
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Court did by Order made, entered and filed on the 28th 
day of J une, 1949, substitute said WILLIAM J. COWAN, 
in his capacity aforesaid, as a party plaintiff in lieu of 
said Ethelbell M. Harmon, deceased, and the said Cowan, 
in his capactiy aforesaid, did by formal instrument join 
in and adopt the allegations of the complaint in the above 
entitled action. (R. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.) 
This action was instituted and prosecuted as a 
representative action on behalf of all owners and holders 
of Class 2 preferred stock of the defendant corporation. 
That the present share ownership of the plaintiffs is as 
follows: 
Ethelbell M. Harmon, deceased- 800 shares 
Richard H. Mumper ....................... 17 shares 
Edwin A. Meserve .................................. 58 shares 
Shirley E. Meserve .................. ... 25 shares 
William J. Cowan 50 shares 
Lesley D. W. Riter 50 shares 
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. .. 9 shares 
Beneficial Life Insurance Co. ...... 100 shares 
Sarah Daft Home .................................... 275 shares 
Edna Dayton ............................................ 58 shares 
Damaris A. Beeman 9 shares 
R. C. Granville ......................................... 25 shares 
J. E. Benedict 25 shares 
(R. 44, 45) 
2. After the commencement of this action, at a 
special stockholders' meeting of the defendant corpora-
tion properly convened at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
March 16, 1948, the Articles of Incorporation of the de-
fendant corporation were amended so as to extend the 
corporate life for a period of five years after April .2, 5 
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1948. Proper certificate of amendment was filed by the 
defendant with the County Clerk of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, and a copy of the certificate of amendment, duly 
certified by the said County Clerk, was filed in the office 
of the Secretary of State of the State of Utah on March 
17, 1948. All of the shares of stock owned by the plain-
tiffs herein were voted in favor of adoption of said 
amendment extending the corporate life of the company. 
(R. 39, 40, 41.) 
3. The defendant was organized as a corporation 
under the laws of the State of Utah on the 4th day of 
April, 1898, and Certificate of Incorporation was issued 
by the Secretary of State of the State of Utah on that 
date. (R. 03.) The capital of said company was fixed in 
the sum of $200,000.00, divided into 750 shares of the 
par value of $100.00 each of 10% non-callable preferred 
stock having a total par value of $75,000.00; and 1,250 
shares of a par value of $100.00 each of common stock 
having a total par value of $125,000.00. The original 
Articles of Incorporation provided: 
"Upon dissolution of this corporation, after the 
payment of all its debts, the remaining assets 
shall be divided among the different classes of 
stockholders according to their preferences, that 
is to say: the preferred stock shall first be paid 
in full, and the balance divided among the com-
mon stockholders pro rata." (R. 03.) 
The duration of said corporation was for the period of 
50 years from and after date of incorporation. (R. 03.) 
The articles of incorporation on their face carried no 
provision with respect to authority of the stockholders 
6 
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to amend the same. (E. 03.) The right of amendment, 
if it exists, was and is dependent upon relevant statu-
tory provisions. Therefore, the denial of the defendant 
of the allegation contained in Paragraph V of the first 
cause of action (B. 22), to-wit: 
"Said original articles of incorporation were 
silent with respect to authority of the stock-
holders to amend the same." (E. 03.) 
is in effect the denial of a legal conclusion. 
4. On December 7, 1900, there was filed in the of-
fice of the County Clerk of Salt Lake County, Utah, an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation of the com-
pany (and a certified copy thereafter on December 11, 
1900, was filed in the office of the Secretary of State of 
the State of Utah, and on said last mentioned date the 
Secretary of State issued his Certificate of Amendment) 
whereby the capital stock of the company was increased 
to the amount of $750,000.00, divided into 75,000 shares, 
each of $100.00 par value. Of said amount $500,000.00 
was represented by 5,000 shares of common stock, and 
$250,000.00 was represented by 2,500 shares of preferred 
stock. The preferred stock was further subdivided into 
750 shares of class 1 preferred stock possessing a total 
par value of $75,000.00 and entitled to a preference over 
all other classes of stock of the company of 10% cumu-
lative dividends, and 1,750 shares of class 2 preferred 
stock with a total par value of $175,000.00 and entitled 
to a preference over the common stock of 6% cumulative 
dividends. There was no express provision in said 
amendment making said preferred shares redeemable 
7 
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or callable. The defendant admits this statement, but 
alleges as a legal conclusion that the stock above de-
scribed was callable and redeemable. (R. 03, 04, 26.) 
5. On April 20, 1907, after the defendant had com-
plied with the relevant provisions of law, the Secretary 
of State of the State of Utah issued his Certificate of 
Amendment to the articles of incorporation of the de-
fendant, whereby its capital stock was fixed in the 
amount of $1,500,000.00 divided into 15,000 shares, each 
of the par value of $100.00. Of said amount $1,110,000.00 
was represented by 11,100 shares of common stock, and 
the remaining capitalization, to-wit, $400,000.00 was 
divided into 4,000 shares of preferred stock. Said pre-
ferred stock was further subdivided into 750 shares of 
class 1 preferred stock possessing a total par value of 
$75,000.00 and entitled to a preference over all other 
classes of stock of the company of 10% cumulative divi-
dends, and 3,250 shares of class 2 preferred stock pos-
sessing a total par value of $325,000.00 and entitled to 
a preference over the common stock of 6% cumulative 
dividends. This amendment contained no express pro-
vision making said preferred shares redeemable or call-
able. (R. 04, 26.) * 
6. On December 2, 1916, the defendant further 
amended its articles of incorporation in the manner re-
quired by law, and on the 5th day of December, 1916, 
the Secretary of State of the State of Utah issued his 
Certificate of Amendment whereby the capitalization 
of the company was fixed in the amount of $2,000,000.00 
divided into 20,000 shares each of $100.00 par value. Of 
8 
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said amount $1,350,000.00 was represented by 13,500 
shares of common stock, and the remaining capitaliza-
tion, to-wit $650,000.00, was divided into 6,500 shares of 
preferred stock. Said preferred stock was further sub-
divided into 750 shares of class 1 preferred stock of a 
total par value of $75,000.00 and entitled to a preference 
over all other classes of stock of the company of 10% 
cumulative dividends, and 5,750 shares of class 2 pre-
ferred stock possessing a total par value of $575,000.00 
and entitled to a preference over the common stock of 
6% cumulative dividends. This amendment contained no 
express provision making the preferred shares redeem-
able or callable. (B. 05, 26.) 
7. On March 2, 1922, after due compliance with 
the relevant provisions of law by the defendant, the Sec-
retary of State of the State of Utah issued his Certifi-
cate of Amendment to the articles of incorporation of 
defendant, which amendment declared: 
" Class 1 preferred stock may be retired or re-
deemed by the Board of Directors at any time 
after the first day of January, 1923, at par plus 
accrued dividends, and such stock may again be 
issued and sold at par with preferred cumulative 
dividends in an amount to be fixed by the Board 
of not more than 6% per annum." 
This amendment, however, contained no express provi-
sion making class 2 preferred stock redeemable or call-
able. (E. 05. 06, 27.) 
8. At some unascertainable time, but long prior 
to the commencement of this action, the Board of Direc-
tors of the defendant corporation redeemed and retired 
9 
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all of the class 1 preferred stock, and at the time of the 
commencement of this action no class 1 preferred stock 
was issued and outstanding. (R. 06, 27.) 
9. At the times and on the occasions plaintiffs 
and their predecessors in interest and ownership pur-
chased and acquired the shares of class 2 preferred stock 
described in plaintiffs' complaint, the articles of incor-
poration of the defendant authorized the issuance by 
the defendant of class 2 preferred shares with prefer-
ence as to dividends at the rate of 6j% per annum, cu-
mulative; and the articles of incorporation further pro-
vided that if said shares of class 2 preferred stock were 
outstanding upon the dissolution of defendant, they 
would have preference in connection with the distribu-
tion of the assets of the defendant, as set forth in 
Article XIII of the original articles of incorporation of 
the defendant. At the time of the original issuance by 
the defendant of said class 2 preferred shares, and until 
the adoption of the amendment to defendant's articles 
of incorporation hereinafter described in paragraph 10 
hereof, the articles of incorporation of defendant, as 
amended, contained no express provisions for the retire-
ment or redemption of said class 2 preferred shares. 
The denial by the defendant of allegations contained in 
Paragraph XI of plaintiffs' first cause of action, to the 
effect that the said class 2 preferred shares were issued 
by the defendant without reserving to it the right or 
privilege of retirement or redemption, constitutes a 
denial of legal conclusions of plaintiffs' pleader, which 
set forth his theory of the case. Further, the affirmative 
10 
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allegation of the defendant in Paragraph 8 of its answer, 
to the effect that all of said shares of class 2 preferred 
stock were issued by defendant company subject to the 
right in the company, through action of its stockholders, 
to amend its articles of incorporation as provided by 
the statutes of the State of Utah so as to provide for 
the calling and redemption of said preferred stock, also 
constitutes a legal conclusion of the defendant, which in 
turn declares its theory of this case. The plaintiffs 
admit that there was no specific agreement or under-
standing made with them personally and individually by 
the defendant that said shares of stock acquired by them 
should remain permanent and unredeemable shares. The 
allegation of this import contained in Paragraph XI of 
plaintiffs' first cause of action is a conclusion based 
upon the status of the articles of incorporation of the 
defendant, and is not an attempt on the part of the 
plaintiffs to assert that independent of the articles of 
incorporation there was any particular personal agree-
ment with them that the shares of class 2 preferred stock 
would remain permanent and unredeemable. The present 
plaintiffs did not acquire their shares of stock directly 
from the company, but from mesne owners. (E. 06, 07, 
27, 28.) 
10. A special meeting of the stockholders of the 
company was held at the office of the company in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the 10th day of November, 1947, at 
the hour of 5:15 o'clock P.M. That said meeting was 
called and noticed as required by law, for the purpose 
of considering amendments to the articles of incorpora-
11 
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tion of the company. At the time of said meeting there 
were issued and outstanding 11,961 shares of the capital 
stock of said company, of which amount 10,135 shares 
were common stock and 1,826 shares were class 2 pre-
ferred stock. Represented at said meeting, either in 
person or by proxy, were 9,823 shares of common stock 
and 1,809 shares of class 2 preferred stock. Of the total 
issued and outstanding common stock 312 shares were 
not represented at said meeting, and of the total out-
standing class 2 preferred stock 17 shares were not rep-
resented at said meeting, by formal power of attorney 
or proxy. There was submitted for consideration by the 
stockholders of the company assembled and represented 
at said meeting, the following resolution: 
"BE IT RESOLVED that the Articles of Incor-
poration of the Company be and they are hereby 
changed and amended so as to make the Pre-
ferred Stock of the Company subject to call for 
redemption, and redemption, at any time by 
the Board of Directors, at par plus dividends 
accrued to the date of redemption, by amending 
Article VIII of the Articles of Incorporation of 
this Company, as heretofore amended, so that 
said article VIII will read as follows: 
< ARTICLE VIII. 
i
 The limit of the capital stock of this corpo-
ration shall be $2,000,000.00, divided into 20,-
000 shares of the par value of $100.00 each, 
of which 13,500 shares having an aggregate 
par value of $1,350,000.00 shall be denominated 
Common Stock, and 6,500 shares having an 
aggregate par value of $650,000.00 shall be 
denominated Preferred Stock; 750 shares of 
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said Preferred Stock having an aggregate par 
value of $75,000.00 shall be designated Class 
One, and 5,750 shares of said Preferred Stock, 
having an aggregate par value of $575,000.00 
shall be designated as Class Two. 
' The holders of Preferred Stock shall be en-
titled to receive, when and as declared, from 
the surplus or net profits of the corporation, 
yearly dividends at the rate of six per centum 
per annum, and no more, payable on dates to 
be fixed by resolution of the Board of Directors. 
The dividends on the Preferred Stock shall be 
cumulative, and shall be payable before any 
dividends on the Common Stock shall be paid 
or set apart; so that if in any year, dividends 
amounting to six per centum shall not have 
been paid thereon, the deficiency shall be pay-
able before any dividends shall be paid or set 
apart for the Common Stock. 
' Whenever all cumulative dividends on the 
Preferred Stock for all previous years shall 
have been declared and shall have become pay-
able and accrue dividends for the current year, 
on the Preferred Stock shall have been de-
clared, and the corporation shall have paid 
such declared cumulative dividends for all pre-
vious years and such accrued dividends upon 
the Preferred Stock for the current year, or a 
sufficient amount for the payment thereof has 
been set apart from the surplus or net profits, 
the Board of Directors may declare dividends 
upon the Common Stock, payable then and 
thereafter out of the remaining surplus or net 
profits. 
'All Preferred Stock shall be subject to call 
for redemption, and redemption, at any time 
by the Board of Directors at par plus dividends 
13 
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accrued to the date of redemption, in such 
amounts as from time to time the Board of 
Directors may deterine, by paying to each 
holder of said Preferred Stock so called for 
redeption, or by depositing to the order of 
such holder at the office of the Company or 
at any bank in Salt Lake City, Utah, a sum 
equal to the par value of the Preferred Stock 
of such holder called for redemption, together 
with accumulated and unpaid dividends thereon 
to date of redemption. If only part of the 
issued and outstanding Preferred Stock is 
called for redemption, the same shall be re-
deemed and paid pro rata among all holders 
of Preferred Stock outstanding.' " . 
Upon motion duly made and seconded, the adoption 
of said resolution was put to a vote, and thereafter the 
Chairman of said meeting declared that the same had 
been adopted by an affirmative vote of 9,823 shares of 
stock represented at said meeting as against 1,809 shares 
which were voted in opposition thereto. Said 9,823 
shares voting in favor of said resolution were all common 
shares represented at said meeting. No class 2 preferred 
shares were voted in favor of said resolution. The nega-
tive vote of 1,809 shares was composed solely of class 2 
preferred shares, which were owned as follows: 
Ethelbell M. Harmon 900 shares 
Hichard H. Mumper 17 shares 
Edwin A. Meserve 58 shares 
Shirley E. Meserve 25 shares 
William J. Cowan 50 shares 
Lesley D. W. Riter .. 50 shares 
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. .— 9 shares 
Beneficial Life Insurance Co 100 shares 14 
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Sarah Daft Home .„ 275 shares 
A. F. Tilton 325 shares 
Total l,809shares 
The 17 shares of class 2 preferred stock not represented 
at said meeting, either in person or by formal proxy, 
were owned as follows: 
Edna Dayton 8 shares 
Damaris A. Beeman 9 shares 
At said meeting the said Dayton and the said Beeman, 
both plaintiffs herein, were in truth and in fact repre-
sented by their attorney and agent, Franklin Riter, Esq., 
who with permission of the Chairman of said meeting, 
read into the records thereof a protest of said Dayton 
and said Beeman against the adoption of said resolution. 
Said Dayton and said Beeman have never consented or 
approved the adoption of said resolution, and have at 
all times dissented therefrom. (R. 07, 08, 09, 28.) 
11. Acting under the authority and direction of 
more than the majority, to-wit more than 2/3 of the 
outstanding shares of stock of the defendant, the defend-
ant by and through the President and Secretary of its 
Board of Directors filed with the Clerk of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, on the 12th day of November, 1947, in 
conformity with the laws of the State of Utah, a certi-
ficate setting forth the amendment to the articles of in-
corporation of the defendant adopted in the form of 
the resolution set forth in Paragraph 10, supra. On the 
13th day of November, 1947, a certified copy of said 
amendment was filed in the office of the Secretary of 
State of the State of Utah, and on said last mentioned 
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date the Secretary of State issued his Certificate evi-
dencing such amendment. The said amendment author-
izes the Board of Directors of the defendant to call for 
redemption and retirement the class 2 preferred stock 
outstanding and owned by plaintiffs in the several 
amounts hereinabove set forth in Paragraph 1 hereof. 
The denials contained in Paragraph 10 of defendant's 
answer, denying that the said last mentioned amendment 
to the articles of incorporation is null and void and with-
out legal effect, and the denial by defendant of plain-
tiffs ' allegation that the adoption of said amendment by 
a majority of the stockholders of the defendant was not 
authorized by law, are denials of legal conclusions set 
forth in plaintiffs' complaint. Likewise, defendant's 
assertion contained in Paragraph 10 of its answer, that 
said amendment was and is authorized by the statutes 
of Utah, is also the allegation of a legal conclusion. The 
further denials of defendant contained in Paragraph 10 
of its answer, of plaintiffs' assertion that Sections 338 
and 339, Revised Statutes of Utah of 1898, as amended, 
do„ not authorize the amendment adopted by defendant's 
stockholders on November 10, 1947, without the consent 
of the owners of all of the outstanding class 2 preferred 
stock; and the further denial by defendant of plaintiffs' 
contention that said sections are unconstitutional or null 
and void as to plaintiffs, in that if said statutes are con-
strued to authorize said amendment without the plain-
tiffs' consent, it impairs the contract rights of plaintiffs 
in derrogation of federal and state constitutional pro-
visions, are denials of plaintiffs' legal conclusions, which 
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set forth their theory of their case against defendant. 
The denial of defendant of plaintiffs' claim of right to 
own and retain their several shares of class 2 preferred 
stock free and exempt from the privilege of redemption 
by defendant, as a vested contract or property right, is 
also a denial by defendant of a conclusion contained in 
plaintiffs' complaint. The allegations of plaintiffs that 
they or their predecessors in ownership and interest ac-
quired said shares of stock upon the agreement or 
covenant of the company that said shares were not 
subject to redemption or retirement, is an allegation 
denied by defendant, but in view of the plaintiffs' posi-
tion hereinabove set forth with respect to the nature of 
this agreement there is no issue of fact here involved. (R. 
09, 10, 28, 29.) 
12. Under the authority of said amendment adopted 
on November 10, 1947, the officers and directors of de-
fendant have expressed and announced their intention 
to call for redemption and retirement all of the class 2 
preferred stock of defendant, at par plus accrued divi-
dends to date of redemption, and defendant will assert 
and claim the right to call for redemption and to redeem 
the shares of stock owned by plaintiffs, and it will after 
such call for redemption refuse to recognize the owners 
and holders of class 2 preferred stock as stockholders of 
defendant. (R. 11, 30.) 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
At the time the defendant was organized, on April 
4, 1898, there was and there still is in effect the follow-
17 
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ing provision of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
to-wit: 
1. Constitution of the State of Utah 
(a) "Corporations may be formed under 
general laws, but shall not be created by special 
acts. All laws relating to corporations may be 
altered, amended or repealed by the Legislature, 
and all corporations doing business in this State, 
may, as to such business, be regulated, limited 
or restrained by law." (Article XII, Section 1.) 
STATUTORY REFERENCES 
1. There was at the time defendant was incor-
porated in full force and effect Section 338, Title 11, 
Chapter 1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, effective 
January 1, 1898, reading as follows, to-wit: 
"338. The articles of incorporation of any 
corporation now existing or that hereafter may 
be organized under the laws of this state may 
be amended in any respect conformable to the 
provisions of this chapter by a vote representing 
at least two-thirds of the outstanding capital 
stock thereof at a stockholders' meeting called 
for that purpose, as hereinafter prescribed; pro-
vided, that the original purpose of the corpora-
tion shall not be altered, nor shall the capital 
stock be diminished to an amount less than fifty 
per cent in excess of the indebtedness of the 
corporation; and provided further, that the lia-
bility of the holder of full-paid capital stock for 
assessments or for the indebtedness of the cor-
poration shall not be changed without the con-
sent of all the stockholders." 
2. Section 338, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, 
remained a part of the Statutes of the State of Utah, 
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unchanged, until it was amended by Chapter 94, Session 
Laws of Utah, 1903, to read as follows: 
"338. The articles of incorporation of any 
corporation now existing or that hereafter may 
be organized under the laws of this State may 
be amended in any respect conformable to the 
laws of this State by a vote representing at least 
two-thirds of the oustanding capital stock thereof 
at a stockholders' meeting called for that pur-
pose as hereinafter prescribed. Provided, that 
the original purpose of the corporation shall not 
be altered, nor shall the capital stock be dimin-
ished to an amount less than fifty per cent in 
excess of the indebtedness of the corporation; 
and provided, further, that the personal or indi-
vidual liability of the holder of full-paid capital 
stock for assessments or for the indebtedness or 
obligations of the corporation shall not be changed 
without the consent of all of the stockholders." 
3. Section 338, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as 
amended by Chapter 94, Session Laws of Utah, 1903, and 
as amended by an act approved March 3, 1905, was fur-
ther amended by Chapter 131, Session Laws of Utah, 
1905, to read as follows: 
"338. The articles of incorporation of any 
corporation now existing or that hereafter may 
be organized under the laws of this State may be 
amended in any respect conformable to laws of 
this State by a vote representing at least a ma-
jority in amount of the outstanding capital stock 
thereof at a stockholders' meeting called for 
that purpose, as prescribed in Section 339 of the 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as amended by 
chapter 94, laws of Utah, 1903; provided, that if 
all the stockholders vote in favor of such amend-
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ment at any meeting of the stockholders, the 
notice required by Section 339 aforesaid need not 
be given; and provided further that the original 
purpose of the corporation shall not be altered 
or changed without the approval and consent of 
all the outstanding stock; provided further, that 
the adding to the purposes or object, or extend-
ing the power and business of the corporation, 
shall not be deemed a change of the original pur-
pose of the corporation; provided, further, that 
the capital stock of the corporation shall not be 
diminished to an amount less than fifty per cent 
in excess of the indebtedness of the corporation; 
and provided further, that the personal or indi-
vidual liability of the holder of full-paid capital 
stock for assessments or for the indebtedness or 
obligation of the corporation shall not be changed 
without the consent of all the stockholders.'' 
4. Section 338 was carried into the Compiled Laws 
.of Utah, 1917, as Section 886 therein and continued in 
force unchanged until amended by Chapter 16, Session 
Laws of 1919 in matters not relevant here, and by Chap-
ter 22, Session Laws of 1921 to read as follows: 
"886. The articles of incorporation of any cor-
poration now existing or that hereafter may be 
organized under the laws of this state may be 
amended in any respect conformable to the laws 
of this state by a vote representing at least a 
majority in amount of the outstanding stock 
thereof at a stockholders' meeting called for that 
purpose as prescribed in Section 887; provided, 
that if all the stockholders vote in favor of such 
amendment at any meeting of the stockholders, 
the notice required by Section 887 aforesaid need 
not be given; and provided further, that the orig-
inal purpose of the corporation shall not be al-
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tered or changed without the approval and con-
sent of all the outstanding stock; provided fur-
ther, that the adding to the purposes or object 
or extending the power and business of the cor-
poration, shall not be deemed a change of the 
original purpose of the corporation; provided 
further, that the capital stock of the corporation 
shall not be diminished to an amount less than 
fifty per cent in excess of the indebtedness of 
the corporation; and, provided further, that the 
personal or individual liability of the holder of 
full-paid stock for assessments or for the indebt-
edness or obligation of the corporation shall not 
be changed without the consent of all the stock-
holders. " 
5. Section 886, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, as 
amended as aforesaid by Session Laws of Utah 1919 and 
Session Laws of Utah 1921, has been carried further into 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 and is now in full force and 
effect as Section 18-2-44, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
which reads as follows: 
"The articles of incorporation of any corpo-
ration now existing or that hereafter may be or-
ganized under the laws of this state may be 
amended in any respect conformable to the laws 
of this state in such manner and by the vote of 
such proportion of all or any class or classes of 
stock as the articles of incorporation may pro-
vide; and in case the articles of incorporation 
do not so provide, by a vote representing at least 
a majority in amount of the outstanding stock 
thereof entitled to vote at a stockholders' meet-
ing called for that purpose as prescribed in Sec-
tion 18-2-45; provided, that, if all the stockholders 
entitled to vote vote in favor of such amend-
ment at any meeting of the stockholders, the 
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notice required by section 18-245 need not be 
given; and 'provided further, that the original 
purpose of the corporation shall not be altered 
or changed without the approval and consent of 
all the outstanding stock, but the adding to the 
purposes or object or extending the power and 
business of the corporation shall not be deemed 
a change of the original purpose of the corpora-
tion; provided further, that no amendment shall 
be made which shall have the effect of reducing 
or of authorizing the reduction of the capital, 
subscribed or paid in, of the corporation to an 
amount less than fifty per cent in excess of the 
indebtedness of the corporation; and provided 
further, that the personal or individual liability 
of the holder of full-paid stock for assessments 
or for the indebtedness or obligations of the cor-
poration shall not be changed without the con-
sent of all the stockholders.'' 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE RESERVED POWER OF AMENDMENT 
CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND IMPLEMENTED BY SEC. 
338, TITLE 11, CHAP. 1, R. S. OF UTAH 1898 (OP-
ERATIVE ON DATE OF INCORPORATION OF 
DEFENDANT) AND SEC. 18-2-44, UTAH CODE 
1943 (OPERATIVE ON DATE OF THE QUES-
TIONED AMENDMENT TO DEFENDANT'S AR-
TICLES OF INCORPORATION) DID NOT AU-
THORIZE THE AMENDMENT TO DEFENDANT'S 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION CONVERTING 
NON-CALLABLE AND NON^REDEEMABLE PRE-
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PEERED STOCK TO CALLABLE AND.REDEEM-
ABLE PREFERRED STOCK. 
1. The power reserved by the State of Utah in its consti-
tution and statutes to amend, alter or repeal all laws 
relating to corporations was the result of the Dartmouth 
College case, and such reservation was and is intended 
to eliminate the results of said decision. 
2. The reservation of power to amend, alter or repeal cor-
poration laws protect the relationship between the state 
and the corporation and is to be exercised in matters 
of public concern and welfare. The reservation of power 
when properly construed does not appertain to the rela-
tionship between the corporation and its stockholders or 
between the stockholders inter se. 
1. The power reserved by the State of Utah in its consti-
tution and statutes to amend, alter or repeal all laws 
relating to corporations was the result of the Dartmouth 
College case, and such reservation was and is intended 
to eliminate the results of said decision. 
The proper orientation of the issues in this case 
can only be made by due consideration to the holding 
of the United States Supreme Court in Dartmouth Col-
lege vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 638, 643; 4 Law 
Ed. 629. The following quotation from Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion is pertinent : 
"The benefit to the public is considered as an 
ample compensation for the faculty it confers, 
and the corporation is created. If the advantages 
to the public constitute a full compensation for 
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the faculty it gives, there can be no reason for 
exacting a further compensation by claiming a 
right to exercise over this artificial being, a 
power which changes its nature and touches the 
fund, for the security and application of which 
it was created. There can be no reason for im-
plying in a charter given for a valuable consid-
eration, a power which is not only expressed, but 
is in direct contradiction to its express stipula-
t i o n s . From the fact, then, that a charter of 
incorporation has been granted, nothing can be 
inferred which changes the character of the insti-
tution, or transfers to the government any new 
power over it. The character of civil institutions 
does not grow out of their incorporation, but out 
of the manner in which they are formed, and the 
objects for which they are created. The right to 
change them is not founded on their being incor-
porated, but on their being the instruments of 
government, created for its purposes. . . . This 
is plainly a contract to which the donors, the 
trustees and the crown (to whose rights and ob-
ligations New Hampshire succeeds) were the or-
iginal parties. It is a contract made on a valu-
able consideration. It is a contract for the 
security and disposition of property. It is a 
contract, on the faith of which, real and personal 
estate has been conveyed to the corporation. It 
is, then, a contract within the letter of the con-
stitution, and within its spirit also." 
This decision has been the subject of discussion and 
comment by Courts and text writers through the years. 
Many diverse opinions were held at one time or another 
concerning its operative effect. The final word on the 
subject, however, is expressed by Fletcher as follows: 
"The true view is that the power to alter, 
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amend, or repeal charters is reserved by the state 
'solely' for the purpose of avoiding the effect 
of the decision in the Dartmouth College Case; 
that the charter of a corporation is a contract 
between the state and the corporation within the 
constitutional prohibition against laws impair-
ing the obligation of contracts, and that the pur-
pose of the reservation is to enable the state to 
impose such restraints upon corporations as the 
legislature may deem advisable for the protec-
tion of the public. Such power is not reserved in 
any sense for the benefit of the corporation, or 
of a majority of the stockholders, upon any idea 
that the legislature can alter the contract be-
tween the corporation and its stockholders, nor 
for the purpose of enabling it to do so. If this 
view is sound — and that it is so seems clear — 
the power of the majority of the stockholders to 
bind a dissenting minority by accepting an amend-
ment of the charter does not depend at all upon 
whether the state has reserved the power to alter 
or amend the charter, but depends essentially 
upon the question whether the change is of such 
character that it may be deemed so far in fur-
therance of the original undertaking, and inci-
dental to it, as to be fairly within the power of 
the corporation to bind its individual members 
by its corporate assent, or whether it is such a 
departure from the original purpose that no 
member should be deemed to have authorized the 
corporation to assent to it for him." (Emphasis 
supplied.) (13 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation— 
Permanent Edition—Section 5776, Pages 85-87.) 
(Cf: 3 Clark & Marshall, Private Corporations, 
Section 631f.) 
The above stated conclusion of Fletcher is fully sup-
ported by authorities cited by him. 
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The following comments may also be appropriately 
considered: 
" I t has been said that the charter of a private 
corporation operates on a three-fold relation-
ship to establish a contract between the State and 
the corporation, between the corporation and its 
stockholders, and between the stockholders and 
the State, and that it also constitutes a contract 
between the stockholders inter se." (12 C. J., 
Section 648, pp. 1023-24.) 
"As the courts have not agreed as to what 
amendments are or are not so material or fun-
damental that they cannot be assented to by a 
majority of the stockholders or members so as 
to bind the minority, there is as to some amend-
ments a direct conflict in the decisions. Among 
the amendments which have been held to be so 
fundamental as to require unanimous assent are: 
• Amendments which are not in relation to matters 
which concern the public, but which change the 
rights of the stockholders or members inter se, 
as by changing the method of voting at corporate 
meetings; amendments authorizing a corporation 
to engage in a fundamentally different business 
or enterprise from that for which it was created; 
authorizing a change from a mutual insurance 
company to a joint-stock company, thus impair-
ing the rights of the policyholders and members; 
converting a gas and electric lighting company 
into a street railway company; authorizing a cor-
poration organized to manufacture preserves, 
syrups, and the like, to engage in the sale of 
liquor; authorizing a railroad, turnpike, or toll 
road company to materially change the termini, 
location, or route of its road, or to extend its 
road to such an extent as to materially change 
the original enterprise; conferring upon a rail-
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road company the privilege of selling its road; 
authorizing a lease of corporate property to an-
other corporation for nine hundred and ninety-
nie years; authorizing a subdivision of the cor-
poration; authorizing corporations to consoli-
date; making non-assessable full-paid stock as-
sessable; increasing the capital stock; reducing 
the minimum number of subscribed shares, thus 
rendering a shareholder liable, who otherwise 
would not be; or authorizing the creation of pre-
ferred stock and compelling the stockholders to 
surrender their common stock and take the pre-
ferred stock in lieu thereof.'' (14 C. J., Section 
194, pp. 189-190.) 
" I t is not important to inquire into the original 
reason for the reservation of this power to 
amend, but it has been judicially suggested that 
it was due to the desire on the part of individual 
states to escape the effect of the decision in the 
Dartmouth College Case. Indeed, Mr. Justice 
Story in his separate opinion suggested this as a 
method by which the states might avoid the effect 
of such a doctrine. Even before the Dartmouth 
College case, the supreme court of Massachusetts 
intimated such a reservation would save to the 
state its power to control corporations. And the 
New Jersey court said that 'the object and pur-
pose of these provisions are so plain, and so 
plainly expressed in the words, that it seems 
strange that any doubt should be raised concern-
ing it. It was a reservation to the state, for the 
benefit of the public, to be exercised by the state 
only. The state was making what had been de-
cided to be a contract, and it reserved the power 
of change, by altering, modifying or repealing the 
contract. Neither the words nor the circum-
stances nor apparent objects for which this pro-
vision was made, can, by any fair construction, 
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extend it to giving power to one part of the cor-
porators as against the other, which they did not 
have before. It was to avoid the rule in the Dart-
mouth College case.' This principle of the re-
served power to amend proceeds on the theory 
that such reservation is incorporated in the char-
ter, and that it qualifies the grant, and hence any 
subsequent exercise of such reserved power can-
not be regarded as an act within the prohibition 
of the constitution. The right to amend under 
such reserved power is unquestioned." (Thomp-
son on Corporations, Third Edition, Section 431, 
pp. 545-546.) 
' 'The exercise of the power of amendment under 
the right reserved either by statute or consti-
tution cannot be arbitrary or unlimited. This re-
served power must be exercised within the scope 
of the original charter. Under it the nature and 
purposes of the corporation cannot be changed; 
they can only be amended. It is conceded that 
under this reserved power the state may tender 
what in its opinion is a proper amendment, and 
require its acceptance, or compel a cessation of 
business. Thus, it was said by the United States 
Supreme Court that ' such a reservation, it is 
held, will not warrant the legislature in passing 
laws to change the control of an institution from 
one religious sect to another, or to divert the 
fund of the donors to any new use inconsistent 
with the intent and purpose of the charter, or 
compel subscribers to the stock, whose subscrip-
tions are conditional, to waive any of the condi-
tions of the contract.' In a much later case the 
court again said: 'The effect of such a provision, 
subject to which a charter is accepted, is, at least, 
to reserve to the legislature the power to make 
any alteration or amendment of a charter subject 
to it, which will not defeat or substantially im-
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pair the object of the grant, and which the legis-
lature may deem necessary to carry into effect 
the purposes of the grant, or to protect the rights 
of the public or of the corporation, its stock-
holders or creditors, or to promote the due ad-
ministration of its affairs.' It has been said that 
under this power the legislature can do no more 
than to waive the public rights; that it cannot 
divert or impair the rights of shareholders as 
between themselves, as it is upon the faith of 
stipulations contained in the charter that the 
shareholders become subscribers and make them-
selves members of the corporation. * * * " 
(Thompson on Corporations, Third Edition, Sec-
tion 438, pp. 555-556.) 
"And it is equally clear that, if the State has 
not reserved the power to alter, amend, or repeal 
the charter of the Corporation, or if, although 
there is such a reservation, it is to be construed 
as is held by most courts, as intended merely for 
the protection of the public, and not for the pur-
pose of enabling the legislature to change the 
contract between the corporation and its stock-
holders, the legislature has no power to author-
ize a majority of the stockholders to bind the 
minority by accepting such amendment; for this 
would be to impair the obligation of the contract 
between the corporation and the dissenting stock-
holders, by forcing them into a different con-
tract, and therefore would be within the consti-
tutional prohibition against laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts.'' (3 Clark & Marshall, 
Private Corporations, Section 631f.) 
"
 #
 * * Any attempt to use the power of amend-
ment for the purpose of authorizing a majority 
of the stockholders to force upon the minority 
a material change in the enterprise is contrary 
to law, and against the spirit of justice. Under 
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such reserved power the legislature has only that 
right to amend the charter which it would have 
had in case the Dartmouth College case had de-
cided that the federal constitution did not apply 
to corporate charters. * *•* The power to make 
given to the legislature. The legislature may 
repeal the charter, but cannot force any stock-
holder into a contract against his will. * * * The 
best view taken of this reserved power of the 
State is that under it a fundamental amendment 
of the charter does not authorize a majority of 
the stockholders to accept the amendment and 
proceed, but that the unanimous consent of the 
a new contract for the stockholders is not thereby 
stockholders is necessary." (Cook on Corpora-
tions, Fifth Edition, Section 501.) 
It is submitted that the doctrine of the Dartmouth 
College case, as interpreted above, definitely limits the 
operative effect of Section 1, Article XII of the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah, which declares that "All 
laws relating to corporations may be altered, amended, 
or repealed by the legislature * * *," of Sec. 338, RS 
1898 and of Sec. 18-2-44, U. C. 1943. 
2. The reservation of power to amend, alter or repeal cor-
poration laws protect the relationship between the state 
and the corporation and is to be exercised in matters 
of public concern and welfare. The reservation of power 
when properly construed does not appertain to the rela-
tionship between the corporation and its stockholders or 
between the stockholders inter se. 
There is a certain aspect of the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Utah in Garey, et al, vs. St Joe Mining 
Company, 32 Ut., 497, 91 Pac.'369, 12-LEA (N.S.) 554, 
which should be considered in interpreting the Consti-
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tutional provision and statutes involved in this action. 
Both Salt Lake Hardware Company and St. Joe 
Mining Company were organized under the statutory 
provisions of similar legal effect. Salt Lake Hardware 
Company was organized on April 4, 1898; St. Joe Mining 
Company in 1897. At the time of the organization of 
the St. Joe Mining Company, Laws of Utah, 1896 at 
p. 30 (Sec. 2273) provided in pertinent part: 
"The capital stock of any corporation * * * may 
be increased * * * or such capital stock may be 
diminished. The name of such corporation may 
be altered, the number of its directors, or offi-
cers be changed * * * the articles of agreement 
or incorporation may be otherwise changed or 
amended; provided such amendment does not 
alter the original purpose of the corporation." 
The foregoing provision was redrafted and appeared in 
E. S. Utah 1898 as Sec. 338 as above set forth in para-
graph 1 of Statutory References, supra. 
The Utah law at the time of the incorporation of 
both companies authorized the articles of incorporation 
to be amended "in any respect" (Salt Lake Hardware 
Co.) or to "be otherwise changed or amended" (St. 
Joe Mining Co.). 
The St. Joe case held that the conversion of non-
assessable shares into assessable shares was not auth-
orized by the statute, and if it were construed as to 
authorize such action, the statute would impair the 
obligations of contract (Utah Constitution, Art I, Sec. 
18; Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec, 10) or would de-
prive the stockholder of his property without due 
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process of law (Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7; Fed-
eral Constitution, 14th Amendment) and therefore would 
be void. The following quotation from the St. Joe de-
cision is relevant: 
"From the texts and the cases it will be seen 
that under the reservation the state is not only 
unauthorized to alter or amend charters of exist-
ing corporations in such a way as will change the 
fundamental character of the corporation, impair 
the object of the grant, or rights vested there-
under, but it is also unauthorized to alter or 
amend them in such a way as will impair the 
contractual relations or rights of the stock-
holders among themselves, or between the cor-
poration and its stockholders; and it will also be 
seen that under the reserved power the Legis-
lature has only the right to amend the charter, 
or laws with respect thereto, which it would 
have had in the event it had been decided in the 
Dartmouth College case that the federal Consti-
tution did not apply to corporate charters. The 
Dartmouth College case did not call in question 
nor involve any right or relation of the corpora-
tors among themselves. It involved only the re-
lation of the corporation and the state. Without 
the reservation it was held that even such rela-
tion cannot be changed without doing violence to 
the federal Constitution. Because of the reserved 
power the state may now amend or alter the 
charter, so far as effecting the contract with it-
self, and so long as it does not change the funda-
mental character of the corporation or impair 
any vested rights acquired thereunder. But, as 
stated by the authorities, the right is reserved 
for the benefit of the state and of the public and 
for public purposes. The power can only be exer-
cised to the extent that the state is interested. 
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It can alter or modify any right, privilege, or 
immunity granted by it. It cannot, however, reach 
out and impair the obligations of contracts exist-
ing between the corporation and its members, or 
among the corporators themselves, any more than 
it can impair the obligations of contracts exist-
ing between other individuals. Undoubtedly it 
may take away altogether the franchise and priv-
ileges granted under it. The exercise of such 
powers pertain directly to its contract, and was 
expressly reserved to the state, and with refer-
ence to which every stockholder subscribed for 
or purchased his stock. So under the reserved 
power, the Legislature may make such reason-
able amendments or alterations as it may deem 
necessary to carry into effect the purposes of 
the grant, or to protect the rights of the public, 
or of the incorporation and its stockholders, or 
to promote the due administration of its affairs, 
when such amendments or alterations will not 
defeat or substantially impair the object of the 
grant or any vested rights. Independent of the 
reservation there are many things which the state 
may do in the exercise of its police powers to-
wards regulating and restricting corporate pow-
ers and functions. When reasonably exercised, 
such legislative enactments do not fall within the 
prohibition of the federal Constitution." 
The line of reasoning of the St. Joe case finds 
support and elaboration in a most respectable and im-
pressive line of authorities: 
"Norris vs. American Pub. Utilities Co. (1923) 
14 Del., Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 was a suit to declare 
void an amendment to defendant's certificate of 
incorporation, by the terms of which it was 
provided (1) that two new classes of preferred 
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stock be created, having preference over the or-
iginal preferred stock; (2) that accumulated div-
idends accrued and unpaid on the original pre-
ferred stock be canceled; (3) that the original 
redemption figure of $105 on the preferred stock 
be reduced to $100; (4) that the preferred stock's 
right be taken away. In respect of the first change 
it was held that since the Delaware Corporation 
Law, under which defendant was organized, au-
thorized changes in the corporate charter affect-
ing the preferences granted to preferred stock, 
the creation of two new classes of preferred stock 
superior to the original preferred stock was au-
thorized, since such change merely affected the 
preference rights of the original preferred stock. 
The third change was upheld under another sec-
tion of the Corporation Law providing: 'Any or 
all classes of preferred stock * * * may be made 
subject to redemption at such time or times, and 
at such price, not less than par, as may be ex-
pressed in the certificate of incorporation, or any 
amendment thereof;' and the fourth alteration 
was permitted under the general clause of the 
statute permitting a corporation to make 'any 
other change or alteration in its charter of in-
corporation that might be desired.' However, it 
was held in respect of the cancellation of the 
unpaid accrued dividends that they represented 
vested rights of the preferred stockholders which 
could not be impaired under either the portions 
of the statute referring to preference rights or 
under the general clause." 
Yoakam vs. Providence Biltmore Hotel Company, 
(1929) D.C. 34 Fed. (2d) 533: This case holds that under 
a statute providing that any corporation may amend its 
charter "by making any other change or alteration in 
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its charter or incorporation that may be desired," that 
the corporation was not authorized to amend its charter 
in such manner as would cancel the obligation under-
taken by the corporation under its original Certificate 
of Incorporation, to set aside $20,000.00 annually as a 
sinking fund for the purchase or redemption of pre-
ferred stock. 
Pronic vs. Spirits Distributing Company, (1899) 58 
N.J. Eq. 97, 42 Atlantic 586: The statute under which 
the defendant was organized authorized it "to amend 
its original certificate with the assent of a majority in 
interest of the stockholders." The defendant attempted 
to amend its certificate by reducing the dividend rate on 
the first preferred stock from 7% to 6%, and from 6% 
to 2% on the second preferred stock. The Court held 
such amendments invalid. The Court said: 
" In my judgment these general powers of 
amendment of the certificate which originally 
fixed the relation between the stockholders inter 
sese do not confer the power of altering the pre-
vious contract of the company itself with the 
stockholder as to the rate of dividend which was 
granted by a stock certificate or contract of the 
company, which was required by the statute to 
express this rate of dividend, and which reserved 
no power of the company to change. Such alter-
ation would impair the obligation of the con-
tract created by the stock certificate issued under 
the company charter." 
Keller vs. Wilson & Company, (1936) Del. 190 Atl. 
115; {Delaware Chancery Court) 180 Atl. 584. Section 
26 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware author-
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ized amendments to corporate charters, increasing or 
decreasing the authorized capital stock or changing the 
common par value, designation, preferences or relative 
participating option or other special rights of the shares. 
The Court held that this statute was prospective in 
operation, and that any amendment which destroyed 
the rights of holders of cumulative preferred stock to 
accrued and unpaid dividends was not within its authori-
zation. 
Consolidated Film Industries vs. Johnson, (1937) 
Del. 197 Atl. 489: The defendant adopted an amend-
ment to its certificate of incorporation which provided 
that the existing preferred stock, on which there were 
dividends accrued and unpaid, should "become and be, 
and shall be surrendered and exchanged for" other pre-
ferred stock entitled to a lower dividend rate. The 
Court held that the corporation had no power under the 
statute mentioned in the Keller case supra to compel 
the plaintiff, who held some of the original preferred 
stock to forfeit his rights to accrued dividends. 
Breslav vs. New York & Queens Electric Light & 
Power Company, (1936) 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N.Y.S. 
932, affirmed without opinion (1937) 273 N.Y. 593, 7 
N.E. (2d) 708: A New York statute authorized corpora-
tions "to classify or re-classify any shares, either with 
or without par value." The corporation, by an amend-
ment to its charter, provided that certain non-callable 
preferred stock would be callable at a given figure. The 
Court said: .. 
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"However, this reserved power is not unlim-
ited, and its exercise is subject to the restrictions 
and restraints imposed by other provisions of 
the State and Federal Constitutions. Due process 
of law must be observed, and vested property 
rights and the obligation of contracts must not 
be destroyed or impaired. Coombes v. Getz, 285 
U. S. 434, 52 S. Ct. 435, 76 L. Ed. 866; Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629, 56 S. Ct. 
611, 80 L. Ed. 943. While limitations on the 
amending power cannot be reduced to fixed rules, 
the following cases illustrate what amendments 
constitute an improper exercise of the reserved 
power * # # 
"If a stockholder may not be deprived of his right 
to vote for all the directors [Lord v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of the United States, 194 
N. Y. 212, 237, 87 N. E. 443, 22 L. R. A. (NS) 
420] or his right to payment on the named re-
demption date [Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 
276 Mich. 200, 267 N. W. 815, 105 A.L.R. 1447], 
or may not be denied his right to a voice in the 
management of a corporation [Page v. American 
and British Manufacturing Co., 129 App. Div* 
346, 113 N.Y.S. 734], or to the continuance of a 
sinking fund set up for the payment of his stock 
[Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co. (DC), 
34 Fed. (2d) 533, 546] and if a majority may not 
make his non-assessable stock assessable [Garey 
v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369, 
12 LEA (NS) 554]—because to do any of these 
acts would result in impairing his contract or 
taking his property without due process of law, 
or both — surely his right to remain a stock-
holder as long as the company exists is entitled 
to equal protection and for the same reasons. Ob-
viosuly the proposed amendment is not designed 
to protect any rights of the public, nor does it 
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concern the policy of the state, nor does it regu-
late or control the internal management of the 
corporation as far as it has relation with the 
state.'' 
A. C Frost <& Company vs. Coeur d'Alene Mines 
Corporation, (1939) Idaho 92 Pac. (2d) 1057: In this 
case the defendant, by amendment to its articles of in-
corporation, attempted to convert non-assessable stock 
to assessable stock. Reliance was placed upon the act 
of the legislature which authorized corporations to 
change non-assessable to assessable stock, although 
adopted after date of incorporation of the company. 
The Court construed the statute as not including power 
to effect such amendment, and cited with approval the 
St. Joe case from Utah. 
Johnson vs. Tribune-Herald Company, 155 Ga. 204, 
116 S.E, 810 involved an amendment to the charter of 
a corporation effected by a majority of the stockholders, 
in the face of opposition by minority stockholders, 
whereby it was proposed to convert non-callable pre-
ferred stock into callable and redeemable shares. The 
Court in declaring such amendment invalid said: 
" I t is now well settled in this state that when 
proposed amendments to a charter are funda-
mental, radical, or vital, the unanimous consent 
of all stockholders to their acceptance is neces-
sary, (p. 811) * * * The next change proposed 
is that the corporation shall have the right to 
retire any and all of the preferred stock, at such 
price as the corporation may agree upon with 
the owner thereof, at such time as it my deem 
proper. * * * There is no provision in the char-
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ter for the retirement of preferred stock. The 
proposed amendment provides for the retire-
ment of preferred stock. This is a radical change, 
and requires the unanimous consent of the stock-
holders to become effective.'' 
Coombs v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 52 S. Ct. 435, 76 L. 
Ed. 866: 
"The authority of the state under the co-called 
reserve power is wide; but it is not unlimited. 
The corporate charter may be repealed or amend-
ed, and, within limits, not now necessary to de-
fine, the interrelations of the state, corporation 
and stockholders may be changed; but neither 
vested property rights nor the obligation of con-
tracts with third persons may be destroyed or 
impaired * # *." 
Midland Co-op. Wholesale v. Range Co-op. Oil 
Assn., 200 Minn. 538, 274 N.W. 624, 111 A.L.K. 1521: 
"The articles of incorporation are the charter 
of a corporation and, subject to the constitution 
and laws of the state, its fundamental and or-
ganic law. * * # It is a contract between the state 
and the corporation and among the corporators 
inter se. * * * It evidences the contract by which 
a stockholder binds himself. It measures and 
determines the nature and extent of the powers 
of the corporation, and defines and limits the 
field of corporate activities and the rights, obli-
gations and liabilities of the stockholders. # # # 
The charter cannot be amended without the con-
sent and acquiescence of all the stockholders un-
less the power of amendment is reserved. The 
power to amend may be reserved by the consti-
tution, statutes or articles of incorporation. The 
reserved power to amend must be exercised with-
in the limits of the reservation * * #. If the 
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reservation is general and not limited in terms, 
the reserved -power of amendment does not per-
mit a change so fundamental as to change the 
nature and purposes of the corporation * * V 
Strout v. Cross A and I Lumber Co., 283 N. Y. 406, 
28 N.E. (2d) 890, 133 A.L.R. 646: 
4
'Preferred stock issued by a stock corpora-
tion may grant to the stockholder a variety of 
rights depending largely upon the financial re-
quirements of the corporation at the time the 
stock is issued. Whatever preferential rights and 
privileges may thus be granted to a stockholder, 
the law regards them as contractual. 'The cer-
tificate of stock is the muniment of the share-
holder's title, and evidence of his right. It ex-
presses the contract between the corporation and 
his co-stockholders and himself; and that con-
tract cannot unwillingly be taken away from him 
or changed' * * *." 
Fidelity Building and Loan Assn. v. Thompson, 51 
S.W. (2d) 578, 599: 
"The reserved right in the state to 'alter, reform 
or amend' charters does not give the state the 
right to destroy or impair the rights of share-
holders to their interest in the property of the 
corporation. If the state can destroy or impair 
the property rights of non-borrowing share-
holders in the instant case by requiring them to 
suffer all losses when their position was equal 
with borrowing shareholders under the contract 
by which they became shareholders, then the 
state in any instance, and as to any corporation, 
can impairand destroy the rights of shareholders 
in the property thereof by legislation enacted 
. after the contract is made." 
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Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 
N.W. 815, 105 A.L.R. 1447, 1451: 
"* * * it seems clear that the redemption right 
of plaintiff as a preferred stockholder is some-
thing more and different in character than an or-
dinary incidental right of a stockholder, such as 
voting for the election of a director, and that his 
right is contractual in nature. The contract right 
was presumably a condition precedent to plain-
tiff's determination to purchase preferred stock 
in the defendant company. The redemption pro-
vision was a definite undertaking on the part of 
the defendant corporation to redeem at a given 
time and on given terms the stock plaintiff agreed 
to purchase. Assuming, as we fairly may, that in 
the absence of the redemption provision plaintiff 
would not have purchased his stock, or that de-
fendant 's undertaking to redeem was an inducing 
cause in consequence of which plaintiff did pur-
chase, the provision for redemption was some-
thing more than a mere incident to corporate re-
lationship ; it was a definite contractual under-
taking, the proposal for which antedated and con-
summation of which coincided with the purchase 
of the stock by plaintiff; who prior to that time 
was not identified with the corporation. This 
being true, appellee's contention above noted is 
not tenable. While it is quoted from a case 
wherein the plaintiff was a creditor of, and not a 
stockholder in, the defendant corporation, we 
think the following statement of the Supreme 
Court of the United States is applicable to the 
instant case: [Quotation from Coombs v. Getz, 
supra]." 
Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co,, 35 Fed. (2d) 
643,645: 
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"We think this overlooks the true effect of the 
existing promise to redeem in 1925. This promise 
was authorized by statute, it was relied upon by 
the investor, and we see no reason why it is not 
essentially a contract beyond the power of the 
corporation to change materially without the con-
sent of the investor. It follows that the statutory 
provisions for extension and the proceedings 
here taken must be regarded as subject to the 
performance of the duty created by this promise. 
The power of the corporation to amend its articles 
or its by-laws cannot extend to making a change 
which would amount to a repudiation of a con-
tract which is distinct from, and in addition to 
all ordinary matters of internal management, 
regulation and control." 
The phrase "may be amended in any respect," con-
tained in both the 1898 statute and the 1943 Code pro-
vision, does not confer unlimited and unrestricted power 
upon the stockholders of a corporation. It is first limited 
by the specific prohibitions or limitations prescribed in 
the statutes themselves. (None, of which are pertinent 
in this litigation.) The phrase is further and most co-
gently limited by the historical events which produced 
the constitutional reservation of power to amend, alter 
or repeal corporation laws and, also, by the underlying 
purpose of such reservation and its implementing legis-
lation. Without a specific directive to the effect that 
such power may be exercised to alter or change the 
relationship between a corporation and its stockholders 
and between the stockholders inter se, the power to 
"amend in any respect" should not be construed to in-
clude the power to impair or destroy a stockholder's 
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rights of property in his shares. If it be accepted that 
the statutory declaration operative at time of organiza-
tion of the defendant authorizing the defendant to 
amend its articles "in any respect" became part of the 
articles in the same manner as if it were written therein, 
it will be binding upon the plaintiffs only insofar as the 
court may define the true substance and meaning of the 
phrase "may be amended in any respect.'' If the court 
refuses to adopt an interpretation granting majority 
. stockholders unlimited power of amendment (subject 
only to statutory restrictions), then such construction 
of the statute is carried into the articles of incorporation 
of defendant. 
The right plaintiffs acquired in the purchase or ac-
quisition of defendant's second preferred stock to own 
and hold the same free and clear of the privilege of re-
demption by defendant was and is a most valuable 
property right. The preference granted was not only 
as to a guaranteed 6% dividend, but also included 
preference on liquidation of the defendant. Plaintiffs' 
shares, therefore, possess qualities which are ordinarily 
not only those of common shares—that of permanency 
of investment—but also qualities usually conferred upon 
preferred shares—that of priority upon liquidation, and 
of dividend payments. There is a combination of legal 
and economic factors which are an integrated part of 
the plaintiffs' property and property rights. (Judicial 
notice may be taken of the notorious fact that non-
callable preferred shares listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange sell at a heavy premium.) Plaintiffs' owner-
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ship of defendant's second preferred shares includes a 
unique proprietary interest in defendant's business aris-
ing out of both the priorities and preferences and the 
permanency of the investment. The latter factor is, in 
view of defendant's acknowledged financial success, a 
vital element in fixing the value of the shares. A de-
struction of the element of permanency will immediately 
destroy a definite and fixed part of the value of defend-
ant's shares owned by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the 
power of amendment should not be construed to include 
the power to destroy this value. 
It is difficult to believe that the people in adopting 
the Constitution and the legislature in enacting legisla-
tion to implement this reserved power of amendment 
intended to confer authority either upon the State or 
upon corporations and their stockholders which would 
enable the State or a majority of stockholders as the 
delegatee of this reserved power to destroy the prop-
erty rights of a minority group. This would indeed be 
the "tyranny of the majority," and would represent 
the exact opposite of the principle which has always 
motivated the political philosophy of the United States 
—that of protecting the minority from the unreasonable 
or oppressive action of the sovereign power exercised 
either by the legislature or by a majority of electors. 
This principle is a fundamental tenet in our constitu-
tional government, and a departure from it in constru-
ing the statutes in question could be justified only as 
an exercise of the police power. It has never been 
asserted that the exercise of this reserved power to 
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amend corporation laws was an exercise of the police 
power, and none is made in the case at bar. 
It is therefore submitted that (1) the history of 
the constitutional reservation of power to amend cor-
poration laws and corporate charters; (2) a funda-
mental tenet in the political thought of the Nation with 
respect to the relationship of minority and majority 
groups; and (3) the decisions of courts and the opinions 
of legal scholars, all support the conclusion that the 
power to " amend in any respect" does not include the 
right of the majority of defendant's stockholders to 
destroy the valuable right of plaintiffs to own and hold 
their preferred shares free from the threat of involun-
tary retirement of same. 
II. 
THE PHRASE "MAY BE AMENDED J N ANY 
RESPECT," CONTAINED IN SEC. 338, R. S. 1898 
AND IN SEC. 18-2-44, U. C. 1943, IS NOT UNLIMITED 
IN ITS OPERATION AND MUST BE CIRCUM-
SCRIBED BY AN INTERPRETATION AND CON-
STRUCTION WHICH WILL PROTECT THE 
RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS FROM 
OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF POWER BY THE 
MAJORITY OF STOCKHOLDERS. 
1. Changes in the rights of outstanding shares of cor-
porate stock can be justified under said statutes only 
when the exigencies and needs of the corporation re-
quire it. 
2. The exercise of the reserved power to amend, alter or 
repeal by a majority of stockholders of a corporation 
should never be sustained when such exercise of power 
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substantially impairs the rights of minority stock-
holders. 
The phrase "may be amended in any respect" is 
capable of a wide variety of interpretations, and the 
decisions of the courts reveal differences which are 
difficult to reconcile. However, leading jurisdictions 
which hold that under this reserved power to amend 
there is no vested right in the stockholders to maintain 
their rights and privileges under the articles of incor-
poration or charter, nevertheless, definitely limit the 
exercise of this power of amendment by the majority of 
stockholders, and approve only amendments which can 
be justified by an exercise of fair business discretion 
and judgment or which the exigencies of business or 
the financial condition of the corporation demands. Pro-
fessor Ballantine of the University of California Law 
School and author of California Corporation Law 
writes in his 1949 Edition as follows: 
"There are two main classes or types of 
amendment which have consequences in the safe-
guards provided: first, those amendments which 
have a similar effect on all the shareholders as a 
body and make some change with respect to the 
enterprise as a whole, such as a change of pur-
poses; second, those amendments which permit 
a specified majority to change the rights and 
relations as between different classes of shares 
and thus change the proportional rights of indi-
vidual shareholders to participate in the enter-
prise. This latter type of amendment is the one 
that has caused great trouble in the courts as to 
what protection should be given against discrimi-
nation and abuses of power, particularly as re-
spects preferred shareholders. 
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"The safeguard primarily relied upon in 
amending statutes for the protection of members 
of a class of shares adversely affected by an 
amendment is the right of a class vote. (John-
son v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280' 
N. W. 688, 117 A. L. E. 1276; note, (1944) Wis. 
L. Rev. 65, 66.) In California a two-thirds vote 
is required, in other states the required per-
centages are about evenly divided between a one-
half and two-thirds class vote. There is some 
variation in the specification of those amend-
ments which are regarded as requiring a vote by 
classes, particularly as to the creation of a new 
class of shares having prior rights and prefer-
ences over an existing class, or an amendment as 
to the purposes of the corporation. 
This rule was applied in DeMello v. Dairyman's Co-
operative Creamery, 73 C. A. (2d) 746, 167 Pac. (2d) 
226. The following example is indicative not only of 
the rule itself, but of its application: 
"Mr. Ballantine in his California Corporation 
Law (1938 ed.) at page 9 in section 7, comments 
on the right of a corporation to change its finan-
cial structure as follows: 
" 'Changes in the rights of outstanding shares 
may be valid if they can be justified as an exer-
cise of fair business discretion in meeting the 
needs and exigencies of the corporate enterprise. 
The more urgent the need or the emergency the 
more drastic the amendment or adjustment which 
fairness will permit, as in changing preferences 
and financial arrangements according to what 
the enterprise can carry. The facts and circum-
stances of each case will enter into the deter-
mination of the validity of the exercise of the 
power in that case.' 
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"The evidence in this case indicates that the 
membership structure of the creamery had 
caused internal dissension and was hampering 
the corporation as well as compelling it to pay 
out unnecessarily, considerable sums in federal 
income taxes; that it was impossible to repay to 
members the full value of their interests with-
out winding up its affairs. It also appears that 
all members were treated alike in the reorgani-
zation in so far as the valuation of the individual 
interests are concerned as well as the repayment 
of that valuation and that plaintiffs and their 
assignors, had they consented to the reorganiza-
tion plan, would have received $100 in cash, 
which was the same amount they would have re-
ceived from the creamery upon voluntary with-
drawal from it, and in addition will receive $965 
in deferred payments. There seems to be nothing 
unfair in this procedure and it is intended to 
settle the internal troubles of the association. 
This brings the case within the rule announced 
by Mr. Ballantine which we believe is a correct 
summary of the law applicable here. Certainly 
the reorganization plan did not violate any vested 
contract or property rights held by plaintiffs so 
it cannot be held to be unconstitutional on the 
grounds urged by them." 
This doctrine finds an interesting example in a 
Canadian case entitled Re Western Grocers (1936; 
Manitoba) 2 West. Week. Eet. 81, 2 D. L. E. 762. It was 
proposed to amend the articles of incorporation to 
render the preferred shares, which, as issued, contained 
no provision for redemption, redeemable at par plus 10 
per cent. It appeared that the company's preferred 
shares were quoted on the stock exchange at $107 per 
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share and the common shares at $49. The net worth of 
the company was such that after the redemption of all 
the outstanding preferred shares at $110 (such shares 
having a par value of $100), sufficient assets would 
remain to give the common shares a book value of 
$85.98. The court wrote: 
" I t is self-evident that the scheme is one cal-
culated for the benefit of the holder of common 
shares at a sacrifice of the preferred shareholders 
of the loss of their investment. Is it such a 
scheme as reasonable men of business might 
pro-perly and reasonably approve? The court will 
not sanction an arrangement unless it is fair and 
equitable to all the parties interested. * * * The 
opinion I have formed, and I feel that I ought 
to express it, is that the strong financial position 
of the company and the total absence of any 
necessity for any assistance or protection and 
the evident intent being to improve the position 
of the holders of the common shares the injustice 
to the preferred shareholders in depriving them 
of the benefit to which, by risk of their initial 
investment of the company, justly entitles them 
to, leads me to the irresistible conclusion that this 
is not the reasonable and fair scheme." 
It appears that the jurisdictions which have estab-
lished this test are operating under constitutional and 
statutory 'provisions with reference to amendment of 
articles of incorporation as broad as those of Utah, and 
that these jurisdictions are committed to the doctrine 
that the constitutional and statutory provisions exist-
ing at the time of incorporation are written into the 
articles of incorporation as if set forth therein in 
extenso. (Cf. 13 Am. Jur. Corporations, Sec. 90, p. 234.) 
49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Professor Ballantine 's doctrine as quoted in the DeMello 
case, supra, is clearly indicative that the rule finds its 
source in the well-established principle that a court of 
equity possesses the power to protect minority stock-
holders against unjust and unfair action on the part 
of majority stockholders. 
" I t is well established that courts of equity 
will entertain jurisdiction in the instance of 
minority stockholders of a private corporation 
who are unable to obtain redress within the cor-
poration and have no adequate remedy at law, 
to restrain, threaten ultra vires acts on the part 
of the majority or to prevent any other act on 
the part of the majority which may be denomi-
nated as a breach of trust or a breach of the 
fiduciary duties owing to the minority." (13 Am. 
Jur. Corporations, Sec 424, p. 476.) 
If it be the conclusion of the court in the instant case 
that the reservation contained in Section 338 of Re-
vised Statutes 1898, which provided that the " articles 
of incorporation * * * may be amended in any respect," 
is sufficiently broad to permit the alleged amendment 
of November 10, 1947, the duty still remains upon the 
court to determine whether or not the alleged amend-
ment, considering all of the facts and circumstances of 
this case, is a valid exercise of the reserved power of 
amendment. 
According to the Ballantine doctrine, after a court 
has found the necessary reserved power in the State to 
authorize corporate action which directly affects or 
changes property and property rights of stockholders, 
and has decided that applicable statutory provisions 
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confer authority upon the corporation to alter or change 
the stockholders' interests and rights, the courts are 
still faced with the consideration of the fairness and 
equity of the proposed scheme, although, of course, the 
fairness of any plan cannot supply the necessary legal 
authority to execute it. 
A study of the court decisions" of the past 15 years 
involving the same problems as are involved in this 
case indicates that they have moved in cycles. Economic 
and industrial demand, plus the chaotic situation inci-
dent to the financial upheaval of the 1930s, influenced 
the courts to give an expansive interpretation of the 
reserved power of amendment. However, this trend 
now shows signs of being halted. When the emergent situ-
ation passed, it was seen that injustice was being inflict-
ed upon innocent persons who had invested their savings 
in corporate securities on the strength of argreements 
contained in the articles of incorporation of issuing com-
panies. These investors were subjected to loss of cer-
tain rights through the operation of this reserved power 
of amendment. The legalistic reply that the investor 
acquired his stock charged with knowledge of this re-
served power of amendment did not meet the situation 
where the reorganization plan was apparently unfair 
or unjust. The courts commenced to draw back from 
the idea that the fairness or unfairness of the corporate 
action could not be considered where the action was in 
exercise of power conferred upon the corporation by 
the act under which it was organized. The reaction is 
now making itself felt, and hence it is that the courts, 
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after affirming the power, examined into the fairness 
and equity of any plan. 
The court in its decision in Havender v. Federal 
United Corporation (1940), 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 At. (2d) 
331, declared that the legal right of the company to 
cancel the stockholders' claim to accrued, accumulated 
dividends was subject to the qualification that such plan 
was fair and equitable with the prescribed method to 
secure such fairness. In 1947 the Federal Court, in 
Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, (C. A. 3d Del.) 
163 Fed. 2d 804, declared that in destroying the rights 
inherent in shares of stock, the plan must meet the test 
of a court of equity that it is not unfair, inequitable, 
or fraudulent. The doctrine was again applied in Forges 
v. Badsco Sales Corporation, 1943, 32 At. 2d. Del. Ch. 
148. See also Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp-
oration, 136 Fed. 2d (C. A. 3d Del.) 944, for definitive 
application of the rule. In the case of Wessel v. Guant-
anamo Sugar Company, 134 N. J. Equity 271, 35 At/ 
2d 215, 135 N. J. Equity 506, 39 At. 2d 431, the plan or 
reorganization was declared to be so unfair and in-
equitable as to be illegal. The court in this case asserted 
that the scheme was for the benefit ofthe common stock-
holders. 
In another New Jersey Case, Kamena v. Janssen 
Dairy Corporation (1943), 133 N. J. Equity 214, 31 At. 
2d 200, 134 N. J. Equity 359, 35 At. 2d 894, the court, in 
substance, concluded that the plan of reorganization 
lacked an essential element of justice or equity because 
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of the failure of the plan to make provision to conden-
sate minority stockholders for their losses. 
The requirement that a court examine a plan of 
corporate reorganization or an amendment to the art-
icles of incorporation affecting the stockholders' rights, 
with the view of determing the necessity for such plan 
and its effect upon stockholders, is a judicial safeguard 
which is highly necessary if the reserved power of 
amendment is to be construed as being comprehensive 
and plenary. Such rule in no respect limits the power 
of the State to supervise its corporate creatures, but it 
does protect minority stockholders from over-reaching 
by the majority group. It is a desirable curb upon the 
will of the majority which protects the minority without 
handicapping the State in the exercise of its proper 
function, and without "straightjacketing" a corporation 
which may be in financial difficulties and worth pre-
serving. It is a salutary rule and one that commends 
itself for its simplicity in application and its effective-
ness in reaching the ends of justice. It correlates an 
unlimited reserved power of amendment as a theoreti-
cal governmental function with the practical aspects 
always involved in this type of case, 
1. Changes in the rights of outstanding shares of cor-
porate stock can be justified under said statutes only 
when the exigencies and needs of a corporation re-
quire it. 
There is no claim nor assertion in the pleadings in 
this action that the defendant's financial condition is 
other than sound. The plaintiffs alleged (R. 17) and the 
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defendant admitted (K. 34, 35) that the value of the 
fixed assets of the company is in excess of a million 
dollars; that the value of the working capital and in-
ventories is in excess of two million dollars; that during 
the period of its existence the defendant has earned 
large profits; that, except for current liabilities, it is 
free from debt; and that its credit standing is among 
the highest of all commercial and industrial concerns 
doing business in the intermountain country. With these 
admissions, the conclusion is free from all doubt that 
the defendant on November 10, 1947, and at the time of 
the commencement of this action was not only solvent 
but, also, was a prosperous merchandising concern, earn-
ing large profits. Further, the pleadings do not reveal 
that there is any internecine dispute or controversy 
existing between the stockholders, directors, or officers 
of the company, except for the present controversy. The 
defendant has not denied, nor will it deny, the state-
ment that in its present condition it is a superb example 
of successful American industry. 
Therefore, there is not presented by the pleadings 
any situation similar to that described in the DeMello 
case, supra, whereby the corporate structure had caused 
dissension among the stockholders which had- hampered 
the company's operations, as well as compelling it to 
pay exhorbitant income taxes. There is not present in 
the case any claims of creditors, and the record may be 
searched in vain to discover any situation which de-
mands a reorganization of the stock structure of de-
fendant. Defendant admits: 
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4 i
 That at the present time it believes it can 
borrow funds for financing its operations at a 
rate of interest less than six (6) per cent per 
annum, and upon that basis (if the class 2 pre-
ferred stock be retired), the source from which 
dividends on common stock may be paid will be 
increased somewhat." (R. 36.) 
This admission explains the underlying purpose of the 
alleged amendment of November 10, 1947. 
The conclusion must be that there is disclosed on 
this facet of the case no facts or circumstances which 
demand that plaintiffs' stock ownership be modified or 
changed. The company does not face insolvency or 
liquidation. Its finances are in splendid condition and 
there is nothing in the pleadings to disclose an emer-
gency condition which demands radical treatment in 
order to sustain defendant's business operations. The 
only purpose for eliminating the class 2 preferred stock 
is to reduce the interest charge on funds used in the 
operation of the company. (R. 36.) Under the circum-
stances disclosed by the pleadings, the exigencies and 
needs of the defendant do not require the elimination 
of plaintiffs' preferred stock. 
2. The exercise of the reserved power to amend, alter or 
repeal by a majority of stockholders of a corporation 
should never be sustained when such exercise of power 
substantially impairs the rights of minority stock-
holders. 
The defendant in its answer (R. 34, 35) to Para-
graph IV of plaintiffs' third cause of action (R. 17) ad-
mitted the following facts: 
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"That - the defendant company has for nearly 
50 years last past engaged in the commercial 
activities for which it was incorporated, with its 
principal office and place of business in Salt Lake 
City, Utah; that the business has expanded and 
grown and defendant now owns and operates 
large branches at Boise, Idaho, and Grand Junc-
tion, Colorado; that in said three cities it has 
constructed, owns, occupies, and operates exten-
sive warehouses and offices; that the value of its 
fixed assets is in excess of a million dollars; that 
its working capital and inventories are also 
valued in excess of two million dollars; that dur-
ing said period the defendant company has 
earned large profits * * #. That, except for cur-
rent liabilities, it is free from debt and its credit 
standing is among the highest of all commercial 
and industrial concerns doing business in the 
intermountain country." (R. 17.) 
The defendant in its answer admitted: 
'
i
 That during the period of 50 years last past, 
the defendant company has paid regular divi-
dends due upon its preferred and common stock, 
except that during the years 1931 and 1932 it 
paid no dividends on its common stock." (R. 35.) 
Defendant further admitted that the dividend record of 
the company has made its class 2 preferred stock a 
desirable investment. (R. 35.) 
These admissions show that the class 2 preferred 
stock of the company holds a unique position in the 
financial structure of the defendant. There were out-
standing at the time of the special meeting of the stock-
holders on November 10, 1947, 11,961 shares of the 
capital stock of the company, of which amount 10,135 
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shares were common stock and 1,826 shares were class 2 
preferred stock. The plaintiffs are the owners of 1,501 
shares of the total of 1,826 shares of class 2 preferred 
stock. 
Here, then, is a corporation possessing assets and 
properties of the approximate value of three million 
dollars, free from debt, represented by 11,961 shares of 
stock, and each share, therefore, possesses an equity 
value of about $250. 
While it is true that the class 2 preferred stock, 
upon dissolution or liquidation of the company, will 
only be entitled to $100 per share, the fact remains that 
each share of preferred stock has an equity of about 
$250 in the assets of the company to guarantee the an-
nual dividend of six (6) per cent on par. It is manifest, 
therefore, that so long as the company remains in op-
eration and is not liquidated, that each share of class 2 
preferred stock, if not subject to redemption, possesses 
an inherent value in excess of its par value of $100. 
With the acknowledged financial success of the company 
over a period of nearly half a century and with a guar-
anteed dividend rate of six (6) per cent on par, the con-
clusion is irrefutable that these preferred shares occupy 
a most distinguished investment position in the inter-
mountain country. If they are non-callable and cannot 
be redeemed, this aspect of their ownership is a sub-
stantial element of their value on the open market. The 
guaranteed dividend of six (6) per cent, supported by 
a $250 equity, and the fact that shares are not subject 
to redemption produces an unusual and most profitable 
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investment. It is obvious that the element of non-call-
ability is one of the three dominant factors determining 
the market value of this stock. If these shares are sub-
ject to redemption, as the defendant contends, then one 
of the primary elements of value is totally destroyed. 
These are facts reflected by the record, and the deduc-
tion is clear that the making of these shares redeemable 
will take away from the preferred stockholders a real 
and genuine element of value and property. The value 
factors herein discussed are most pertinent and relevant, 
and should not be ignored by the court. Whether the 
non-redemption privilege is a "vested'' property right, 
or whether it is a preferential privilege only, a realistic 
analysis of the elements giving value to these shares 
compels the conclusion that the elimination of the non-
redemption privilege will substantially damage preferred 
stockholders. 
If, however, these shares cannot be redeemed at 
the will of the defendant, the open market value of the 
shares, in view of the successful financial history of the 
company, will be substantially above par. On the other 
hand, if these shares are redeemable, this premium will 
disappear automatically and the value of the shares 
will be but par or less. This situation calls for equitable 
relief, in order to protect the investments of these stock-
holders against partial emasculation. 
It is not difficult to imagine supposititious cases 
which prove that the phrase "may be amended in any 
respect" cannot be applied literally in determining the 
validity of the alleged amendment of November 10,1947: 
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(a) If, for example, the articles had been 
amended to change the preference on the preferred 
stock to $1.00 per share on liquidation instead of $100 
per share, the result would be so shocking to the sense 
of justice and fair play of the court that such amend-
ment would be declared null and void. 
(b) If, for example, the articles had been amend-
ed so as to provide that the preferred stock should be 
redeemable at $1.00 per share instead of $100 per 
share, the corporation being in its present financial 
condition, it is certain that no court in the land would 
sustain such amendments. 
These examples are not far-fetched situations, if 
the theory is adopted that the phrase in question is un-
limited in its application and scope. Obviously, there 
must be a limit beyond which a corporation cannot go 
in exercising this reserved power of amendment. The 
doctrine set forth by Professor Ballantine has direct 
and immediate application in order to prevent abuse 
of power by the majority of stockholders. 
The examples given and the alleged amendment of 
November 10, 1947, while differing in degree in their 
impact on the preferred stockholders' rights, are in the 
same category. If the defendant can change non-re- 4 
deemable preferred stock to redeemable preferred stock, 
there is no limit to the power of the majority of stock-
holders (whether it be a simple majority or a two-thirds 
majority or a three-fourths majority). The court should 
refuse to accept a literal reading of the questioned 
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phrase and assert the right of examining the surround-
ing facts and circumstances in each case to determine 
whether or not an amendment meets the test of fairness, 
justice, and equity. If this rule is adopted in Utah, it 
is submitted that the alleged amendment of November 
10, 1947, cannot stand, because it represents an abuse 
of power of the majority of stockholders. 
Plaintiffs, in submitting the foregoing argument in 
support of their contention that the phrase "may be 
amended in any respect'' cannot be applied literally, 
take cognizance of two decisions in the Supreme Court 
of Utah relating to and construing the reserved power 
of amendment of articles of incorporation. Reference 
is made to the following decisions: Salt Lake Automo-
bile Company v. Keith O'Brien Company, 45 Utah 218, 
143 Pac. 1050; and Weed v. Emma Copper Company, 
58 Utah 524, 200 Pac. 517. The defendant in the lower 
court relied heavily upon these two cases to support its 
contention that its alleged amendment of November 10, 
1947, was a valid exercise of the reserved power of 
amendment. 
The Salt Lake Automobile Company case involved 
an amendment which created a new class of preferred 
stock having priority over a previous preferred issue 
t and the common stock of Keith O'Brien Company. Plain-
tiffs sought an injunction against the issuance of the 
new preferred stock. The following quotation from the 
decision in this case strikingly reveals the underlying 
reasoning for the court's decision upholding the validity 
of the amendment: 
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"In no event has a preferred stockholder a spe-
cific lien upon the assets of the corporation. At 
most he has but a conditional promise or obliga-
tion of the corporation to pay, and in case the 
corporate business is discontinued, and its affairs 
are wound up, he, as against the common stock, 
or inferior classes of preferred stock, may be, and 
ordinarily is, entitled to preference. He, how-
ever, by reason of the right to amend and change 
the articles of incorporation, takes his stock sub-
ject to such right. In the very nature of things, 
therefore, the issue and sale of preferred stock 
cannot affect the rights of stockholders, whether 
holders of common or preferred stock, in a 
greatly different way than such right is affected 
by the issue of promissory notes or other unse-
cured obligations. Such obligations do not, as 
against the company or its creditors, constitute 
liens like mortgages. 
i
' In the case at bar no one could have doubted 
the right of the company to secure funds by 
mortgaging its assets, if it were done in good 
faith to protect its credit or to further its busi-
ness interest. Had it done so, appellant's stock 
and his right to dividends would have been sub-
ject to the indebtedness so created and secured, 
whether it were large or small. Are his legal 
rights or the value of his shares of stock affected 
in a different way or to a greater extent by the 
issue of the Class A stock than would have been 
the case by the issue of bonds, or even by the 
giving of promissory notes secured by mortgage 
upon the property of the company? * * * If to 
amend the articles of incorporation so as to issue 
preferred stock and to classify the same invades 
a constitutional right, then, of course, a business 
rival who is a stockholder may prevent the amend-
ment without giving his consent, and no one could 
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complain. If, however, to so amend the articles 
does not invade such a right, then he may not 
complain, although it may affect the value of his 
stock. The latter might be the affect upon his 
stock in case of a mortgage or other pledge of 
the corporate property to secure a debt, and yet 
- no one contends that he could prevent the giving 
of a mortgage, if necessary to raise funds, and of 
the necessity to do so the governing body of the 
corporation, if acting in good faith, would ordi-
narily be the judge. No one doubts that a major-
ity of the stockholders could authorize a loan and 
a pledge of the corporate property to secure its 
payment." 
The Weed case involved the power and authority 
of Emma Copper Company to convert non-assessable 
shares into assessable shares by amending its articles 
of incorporation. In sustaining the company's right to 
do this, the court wrote: 
" In arriving at such conclusion we are not 
unmindful of the plaintiff's contention that fully 
paid stock is the property of the stockholder and 
that by forfeiting the same his property rights 
are affected. The contention to our minds is, 
however/not applicable here. If, for example, 
the corporation is indebted and no assessments 
may be levied to raise funds to pay such indebted-
ness, judgment may be obtained against it and 
all of its assets sold to pay the same. It might 
just as logically be contended, therefore, that that 
4
 may not be done because it deprives the stock-
holder of his interest in the corporation and thus 
affects his private property rights. His stock 
merely represents whatever interest he may have 
in the property or assets of the corporation. If 
the corporation has no property or assets, or is 
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insolvent, his stock is necessarily worthless. If, 
therefore, an assessment is levied upon his stock 
to pay debt and he and the other stockholders 
fail to pay the same and the property of the cor-
poration is sold to satisfy the indebtedness, each 
stockholder is precisely in the same situation, 
and no worse, than if his stock is forfeited for 
non-payment of the assessment." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Supreme Court, in these decisions, used as its 
measuring rod the economic aspect of the situation with 
respect to corporate debts and the rights of creditors. 
It is earnestly suggested that in both of these cases the 
court reached the conclusion that no contract or prop-
erty rights of the plaintiffs were being impaired or de-
stroyed by the corporate action involved, because those 
contract and property rights could be impaired or de-
stroyed through creditors' action which, theoretically, 
at least, could be prevented by the sale of preferred 
stock (as in the Salt Lake Automobile Company case), 
or by levying of assessments (as in the Weed case). 
It is significant that in both of these decisions the court 
in principal part justifies its conclusion that no substan-
tial contract or property rights of the plaintiffs were 
affected by introducing into its line of reasoning the 
rights of creditors. It would seem that the court has 
already committed itself to Professor Ballantine's doc-
trine and has not attempted to read and apply the 
phrase "may be amended in any respect'' literally. Had 
that been the process of the court, it could have quickly 
reached its decisions in both cases by declaring that the 
phrase contemplated any and all kinds of amendments, 
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regardless of their effect upon minority stockholders. 
It did not follow this course of reasoning, as it appar-
ently sensed the fact that a situation could, or would, 
arise where such overall interpretation would result 
in grievous wrong being inflicted upon dissenting stock-
holders if it opened the gates to unlimited amendments. 
(Note the emphasized sentence in the passage from the 
Weed case.) Accordingly, the plaintiffs assert that the 
holdings of these two decisions do not foreclose the Su-
preme Court from giving affirmative assent to Profes-
sor Ballantine's doctrine, in that these decisions may 
be easily explained as being but one aspect of the whole 
problem. There will be nothing inconsistent in the posi-
tion of the court if it holds that the amendment involved 
in this action is invalid because of its unfair effect upon 
the plaintiffs' rights in the absence of any economic 
factor involving the financial stability of the defendant. 
Bather, such conclusion will be consistent with the posi-
tion of the court exhibited in the two decisions above 
discussed, as it will consider the need of a corporation 
to effect a proposed amendment and its ultimate reper-
cussion upon the stockholders. It is further relevant to 
mention the fact that the amendment approved in the 
Salt Lake Automobile Co. case affected all of the common 
stock and all of the second preferred stock, equally, and 
that the amendment approved in the Emma Copper Com-
pany case affected all of the outstanding shares of stock 
of the company equally. There was no discrimination in 
either case against any class of stockholders. In the 
case at bar the alleged amendment is aimed directly at 
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the second preferred stockholders and affects only their 
rights. 
By a supplemental answer (R. 39, 40), the defend-
ant alleged that on March 16, 1948, at a special stock-
holders' meeting, an amendment was adopted extending 
the life of the corporation by a period of five years, and 
that the stock owned by the plaintiffs was represented 
at that meeting and voted in favor of the amendment. 
The holding of the Supreme Court in Fower v. Provo 
Bench Canal and Irrigation Company, 99 Utah 267, 101 
Pac. (2d) 375, that laws in force at the time of the exten-
sion of the corporate life of the company forms a part 
of the contract between the corporation and its stock-
holders, does not in any respect influence or impair 
the arguments of plaintiffs herein made. The provision 
of Section 338, R. S. 1898, is the same as is found in 
Section 18-2-44, Utah Code 1943. Therefore, if the 1898 
provision is wholly ignored, the 1943 Code section be-
comes controlling. Plaintiffs' contentions, as herein 
made, are applicable and equal to both statutes. Need-
less to state, if the November 10, 1947, amendment is 
invalid, it would be invalid from its inception and 
would form no part of the articles of incorporation of 
the company. As a consequence, the action of the plain-
tiffs in voting to extend the corporate life of defendant 
in no way changed their position nor impaired their 
right to question in this action the 1947 amendment. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully submit that 
the court should declare that the alleged amendment of 
65 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
November 10, 1947, of defendant's articles of incor-
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